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CLASS GIFTS: INCREASE IN CLASS MEMBERSHIP
AND THE RULE OF CONVENIENCE
When an individual disposes of his property, it is not always
possible to identify the recipients by their individual names.
Often the most convenient means of identification is by reference
to a number of persons having a common characteristic and
thought of as a group. If a disposition is made to such a group,
and it is not on its face a transfer of title to any particular or
designated member or members of the group, it is referred to
as a "class gift".
Perhaps the most familiar definition of a class gift is that
"it is a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons un-
certain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained
at a future time, and who are all to take in equal or in some
other definite proportions, the share of each being dependent
for its amount on the ultimate number of persons'." A gift of
property, real or personal, ". . . to the children of A" would
be a simple illustration of a class gift.
As in any area of the law, there are many interesting aspects
to a study of class gifts. First, of course, it must be determined
if the disposition has created a valid class gift or if it has
created a gift to individuals. Really, this amounts to a de-
termination of whether the transferor was group-minded or
individual-minded. Although this determination is a very in-
teresting aspect of class gift problems, it is not within the
scope of this paper, and for the purposes of this paper it will
be assumed that a valid class gift has been created. This will
enable us to examine the problem of the determination of the
membership of the class.
The determination of the membership of a class has two
important phases-the determination of the minimum mem-
bership and the determination of the maximum membership.
I JARMAN ON WILLS (6th Ed.) p. 262. Also quoted in: Bethard v.
Iverson, 35 Wash. 2d 344, p.2d 783 (1949); Lawes v. Lynch, 6 N.J. 1,
76 At 1.2d 885 (1950); Lawrence v. Westfield Trust Co., N.J. Super. 423,
61 At 1.2d 899 (1948).
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Generally, the minimum membership of a class is a problem of
determining when the class vests. For example, where a class
gift is created by will and is a present vested right of future en-
joyment, in the absence of any applicable lapse statute, the mem-
bership of the class will decrease from the time of the execu-
tion of the will until the death of the testator2 . However,
the class will not decrease after the death of the testator unless
there is an express or implied condition in the will that the
members must survive the time of distribution or some other
time subsequent to the death of the testator. Thus, the general
rule is that the class membership will not decrease after the
vesting of the gift, and the minimum membership of the class
is, therefore, determined at the time of the yesting. Of course,
there are many refinements to this problem of determination
of minimum membership, but here I have attempted only to
point to the general rule.
When must a person who initially meets the class descrip-
don be born in order to be entitled to share in the gift? The
answer to this question involves an examination of the de-
termination of the maximum membership of the class, or, to
express it another way, the selection of a date at which the
class will close to additional members. If a valid class gift
has been created by the language of a will reading "to X for
life, then to the children of Y," what date will be used to
determine the maximum number of Y's children who will
share in the distribution? There are four possible dates which
could be used for this determination: the date of the execution
of the will, the date of the testator's death, the date of the
distribution of the gift, and finally, the date at which it would
be impossible for Y to have any additional children.
In making a choice among these four possible dates, it is
apparent that the courts should attempt to reach the result
which would be most in harmony with the intent of the
testator had he foreseen the problem. As in all areas of class
gift problems, it is presumed that the testator would, generally
2 In Re Watson's Estate, 109 N.Y. S.2d 381, 201 Misc. 193; Affirmed, 110,
N.Y.S.2d. 461, 279 App. Div. 480; Appeal Denied, 112 N.Y.S.2d 318, 279'
App. Div. 975 (1951); In Re Doolings Will, 285 N.Y.S. 603, 158 Misc.
333 (1936); Lawrence v. Westfield Trust Co., supra, note 1.
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(1) want to include as many children as possible, (2) desire
as early a distribution as possible, and (3) not want to have
any part of the gift fail by lapse or otherwise. In view of
these presumptions, what date for the closing of the class
would be most likely to carry out the testator's presumed
wishes?
It can be argued that the date of the execution of the
will or the date of the testator's death should control, since it
is very likely that the testator desired to give his property
to persons he knew. However, the use of either of these dates
would probably not enable the gift to include as many children
as possible and would defeat many of the advantages of the
use of a class designation.
There remain, then, the date of distribution or the date
at which it would be impossible for Y to have any additional
children. These would seem to be the two dates which, if
used for the determination of the maximum membership of
the class, would benefit the largest number of Y's children
by allowing maximum class membership. In choosing between
these two dates, the English3 and American4 courts have been
in general accord in using the date of distribution as the time
at which the class should close. This selection has been based
on the inconvenience of using the latter date, and, conversely,
the convenience of using the date of distribution.
The inconvenience of using the date at which it would be
impossible for any additional members of the class to come
into being is rather evident. For example, if Y is still living
and married at the time of X's death, it may be very possible
for additional members of the class (i.e. Y's children) to come
into existence after the death of X (i.e. after the date of dis-
3 Andrews v. Partington, 2 Cox 223, 3 Bro. C. C. 401 (1791); Barrington
v. Tristam, 6 Ves. 345 (1801); Farman v. Barrett, 1 Ch. 466 (1927);
Clarke v. Clarke, 8 Sim. 59 (1836); Robley v. Ridings, 11 Jur. 813 (1847);
In Re Emmet's Estate, 13 Ch. Div. 484 (1880).
4 Simpson v. Spense, 58 N.C. 208 (1859); In Re Billings' Estate, 268 Pa. 67,
110 Atl. 767 (1920); In Re Orr's Will, 144 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1955); Wil-
liams v. Harrison, 72 Ind. App. 245, 123 N.E. 245 (1919); Austin's Estate,
315 Pa. 449, 173 At 1. 278 (1934); Thomas v. Thomas, 149 Mo. 426, 51
S.W. 111 (1899); Brownell v. Edmunds, 209 F.2d 349 (Va. 1952).
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tribution). How, then, is distribution to be made at the
termination of the life estate? It would be possible to give to
each class member a portion of the gift, the size of the portion
being determined by the number of class members already
born. But what will happen when another child is born to
Y after the date of distribution? If this subsequently born child
is to share in the gift, each share that has already been dis-
tributed will have to be reduced. Thus, at the time of dis-
tribution each share would be received subject to partial di-
vestment, and no member of the class could obtain an inde-
feasible interest until the possibility of children being born to
Y had been completely eliminated. Therefore, the interest
which the class members would receive at the time of distribu-
tion would be of little real value or use until it was no longer
possible for additional class members to be born.
In order to protect the interests of unborn class members,
a further inconvenience is caused by the necessity of some form
of guarantee against the dissipation of the estate by the dis-
tributees. If realty is involved, the recording acts would prob-
ably give sufficient notice to third parties, but the possibility
of a cloud on the title could prove to be very annoying. If
personalty is involved, the problem becomes more accute.
It would probably necessitate the giving of security by the
present distributees or the establishment of a trust. Either of
these alternatives would involve additional expense, delay and
work. In addition to all of these factors, it seems quite clear
that a quick settlement of the estate is in the interest of public
policy.
In view of these inconveniences, it is not too difficult to
understand why the general rule in the English and American
decisions has been to select the date of distribution as the date
at which the maximum membership of the class will be de-
termined. A suggested reason for the court's selection of this
date is the belief that if the transferor had been aware of the
problems involved, he would have intended that a class member
be permitted to take his indefeasible share of the gift in
possession at the time when all conditions precedent to the
interest of the class member had been performed and when
all prior interests had ended. This is possible only if persons
who fit the class description, but are born after the date of
distribution, are excluded. Because the considerations which
have created the rule are matters of convenience, the rule has
been labeled the rule of convenience.
The rule of convenience, then, is simply the general'
rule that the maximum membership of a class will be de-
termined at the time of the first principal distribution. The
rule is well stated by Jessel, M. R. in an old English case:
"There has, however, been established a rule of con-
venience . . . that since when a child wants its share
it is convenient that the payment of the share should
not be deferred, it shall be made payable by preventing
any child born after that time from participating in
the fund. The rule is, that, so soon as any child would,
if the class were not susceptible of increase, be entitled
to call for payment, the class shall become incapable
of being increased'."
The date of distribution, then, becomes the important
date in the determination of the maximum membership of a
class, and this date can generally be defined as that time at
which a member of the class described is entitled to demand
in possession a share of the subject matter of the gift. The
date at which a class member can make this demand will be
determined by any manifestations of intention by the trans-
feror. If this intention is not clear, the court will have to de-
cide what the transferor would have intended had he been
aware of the matter.
If the gift, bequest, or devise is immediate, the date of
distribution will be at the date the gift is made or at the date
5 The rule in Kentucky is different. When the gift is to near relatives of the
transferor, the Kentucky courts have held that the class should remain open
until all possibility of increase is extinguished. Azarch v. Smith, 222 Ky.
566, 1 S.W.2d 968 (1928); Patterson's Executor v. Dean, 241 Ky. 671, 44
S.W.2d 565 (1931); it seems, however, that when the members of the
class are not closely related to the transferor, the class will not remain open
until all possibility of increase is extinguished; See, Barker v. Barker, 143
Ky. 66, 135 S.W. 396 (1911).
6 In Re Emmet's Estate, 13 Chi. Div. 484 (1880).
of the testator's death as the case may be. It should be noted
that in the case of immediate gifts the date for the determina-
tion of maximum and minimum membership of the class is
the same. There are additional considerations, however, when
the bequest or devise is to take effect at some future date, and
in the case of these postponed gifts, the selection of the date
for determination of the maximum membership of the class
is separate and distinct from the selection of a date for the
determination of minimum membership. Of course, the date
of distribution could not occur prior to the termination of any
interests which precede the class gift, and no class member is
entitled to distribution so long as any condition precedent to
his interest remains unperformed. However, in line with the
rule of convenience (and, in fact, really just another way of
stating the rule), it is generally agreed that the transferor, if
he knew all of the circumstances, would not intend to delay
the distribution until it would be impossible to have the class
membership increase. "Thus, it is not a condition precedent to
the right of a class member to demand the possession of his
share that it be no longer possible for additional members of
the group described to be born. If the condition attached to
the share of a class member is not precedent, his right to de-
mand possession of his share will not be postponed any further
than it would be in the absence of such a condition. Generally,
then, it can be said that if there are no outstanding unsatisfied
interests which precede the gift to the class and if all condi-
tions which are precedent to the interest of any member of
the class have been performed, the period of distribution has
arrived'."
It should be noted that the operation of the rule of con-
venience has two aspects-an inclusionary aspect and an ex-
clusionary aspect. It seems that little criticism can or has been
directed at the inclusionary aspect of the rule, since it appears
to be in complete harmony with the presumption that the
transferor would desire to benefit as many members of the
class as possible. For example, in the case of a bequest or
devise, the operation of the rule makes it possible for the class
7A James Casner, Class Gifts (AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, Little-
Brown and Co., 1952, Vol. V. Sec. 22.40, p. 346).
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membership to increase even after the execution of the will
and in the case of an immediate bequest or devise, until the
date of the testator's death, or in the case of a postponed
bequest or devise, until the date of distribution. The principle
benefit to be obtained from the inclusionary aspect of the rule
of convenience is that the operation of the rule often has the
effect of keeping the class open to increase until all possible
class members have been born. This is true in the common
disposition by a testator to his children. All of his children
living at the date of his death will be included in the gift,
since it would be impossible for the period of distribution to
arrive until after the testator's death. This would also be
true in the case of a disposition of property to the children of
a life tenant. Since the period of distribution of this postponed
gift to the children of a life tenant could not arrive until the
death of the life tenant, all possible members of the class
(i.e. the life tenant's children) would share in the gift. As
is often the case, the class gift may be given to the children
of a deceased person. Here again the operation of the rule
would include all possible members of the class.
Since dispositions of the above types frequently occur,
it can be seen that often the exclusionary aspect of the rule of
convenience is of no importance. When the exclusionary aspect
of the rule does operate, its operation must be justified on the
basis of eliminating the inconveniences which would occur in
the absence of an application of the rule and on the basis of
carrying out what is presumed would have been the trans-
feror's intention if he had been aware of the problem.
Briefly, let us examine the application of this rule-first
to a gift with postponed distribution and then to an immediate
gift. If a bequest is made ". . . to the children of A attaining
the age of twenty-one," the distribution of the gift will be
postponed until a child of A attains the age of twenty-one.
Since the date of the first distribution will occur when the
oldest child of A reaches the age of twenty-one, that is the
date at which the maximum membership of the class will be
determined, and if any children are born to A after that date
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(except, of course, for children en ventre sa mere)8 they will
be excluded. The convenience of dosing the membership to
increase at that date seems apparent, since then a distribution can
be made and the shares can be determined. However, it has been
pointed out that the rule of convenience "must be very in-
convenient to those children who may be born after the period
of distribution."
In the case of a present absolute bequest .. to the children
of A" the date of distribution would be immediate (i.e. the
date of the testator's death) if A had children living at that
date. If A is still living, there would be a possibility that
additional children may be born to A; however, these sub-
sequently born children would be excluded. While some
writers1" say that this is justified on the basis that the testator
would probably have intended to include only those of A's
children whom he knew, this does not appear to be a con-
vincing argument for the operation of this exclusionary aspect
of the rule of convenience. If this were so true as to justify
the exclusionary aspect of the rule in the situation where
there is an immediate gift, would it not be more appropriate,
in order to be consistent, to say that in the case of a postponed
gift the class should close at the date of the testator's death
(rather than at the date of distribution) so as to eliminate
the possibility of any portion of the gift going to any of A's
children who were unknown to the testator? This would, of
course, run contra to the presumption that a transferor would
desire to benefit as many class members as possible. Therefore,
it seems that the strongest justification for the exclusionary
aspect of the rule of convenience is that it avoids the in-
convenience of delaying the final distribution of the gift.
It should be noted that the exclusionary element of the rule
of convenience (as well as the inclusionary element) can easily
8 This is in accord with the generally recognized doctrine in property law to
the effect that, when it is beneficial to the child, a child begotten but not
born is, for most purposes, treated as in being. 2 Simes, FUTURE IN-
TERESTS, Sec. 388 (1936).
9 The remark is that of Justice Chitty in In Re Wenmoth's Estate, 37 Ch. Div.
266, 57 L.J.Ch. 649, 57 L.T. 709, 36 Wldy. Rep. 409 (1887);
10 2 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS, Sec. 374 (1936).
be avoided by careful and precise drafting of the dispositive
instrument. For indeed, the rule of convenience is a presump-
tion and is rebuttable by a clear indication of contrary intent,
either by express words or by the circumstances surrounding
the disposition.
If, in the case of an immediate class gift, there are no
members of the class in existence at the date of distribution,
the rule of convenience is not applied, and all persons who are
thereafter born and fit the class description are admitted to
the class 1 . For example, if a bequest is made ". . . to the
children of A," and A is still alive and has no children (in
esse or en ventre sa mere) at the time of the testator's death
(the date of distribution), then any and all children there-
after born to A will be included in the membership of the
class, and the class will not be closed at the testator's death.
The reasons for this exception to the application of the rule
of convenience are easy to understand. If the class would
close at the date of the testator's death, the gift would fail
and the disposition would be a nullity. This is obviously contra
to the presumption that the testator would not want any part
of the gift to fail, and if there were no children in existence
at the time of making the bequest, the testator must have
intended to benefit all class members whenever born. Thus,
if we let in any child of A after the date of distribution, there
is no conceivable reason why we should not admit all of the
children of A. Therefore, the first child to be born to A after
the testator's death would receive the property subject to partial
divestment by the birth of other class members'". It is very
true that this causes all of the inconveniences mentioned above
which have caused the creation of the rule of convenience,
but it would seem that the desire to prevent any gift from
failing and becoming a nullity overrides the inconveniences
involved.
11Weld v. Bradbury, 2 Vern. 705, 23 Eng. Rep. 1058 (1715); Bailey v.
Brown, 19 R.I. 669, 36 At1. 581 (1897); Male v. Williams, 48 N.J. Eq.
33, 21 At 1. 854 (1891); Shepherd v. Ingram, Ambler, 448; 27 Eng. Rep.
296 (1764).
12 Gest v. Way, 2 Whart. 445 (Pa. 1837); Weld v. Bradbury, supra, note 11.
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Does the rule of convenience apply to gifts of income?
An examination of the materials on this question indicates
that the rule does not apply to gifts of income1". This appears
to be in harmony with the reasons for the rule of convenience,
since there really are no inconveniences involved in admitting
new class members to gifts of income. Since there is no dis-
tribution of corpus, the income can be distributed at established
intervals to those class members in existence at that time.
This means that if such a construction will not cause the gift
to be invalid because of the rule against perpetuities each
income payment is treated by the court as a separate and
distinct gift, and a class member is excluded only from those
distributions made prior to his birth 4 . This construction is
supported by the presumption that the transferor would wish
to benefit as many class members as possible.
This raises the additional question as to whether or not
the rule of convenience (or any other rule of construction)
should ever be varied in its application so as to avoid the rule
against perpetuities. While no attempt will be made in this
paper to decide this complex issue of interpretation of the
rule against perpetuities, it should be noted that some au-
thorities' 5 seem to indicate that the application of the rule
of convenience might be varied so as to avoid the making
of a gift bad under the rule against perpetuities. This theory
is well stated by A. James Casner:
"The theory which is advanced to justify a different
result when the rule against perpetuities is involved
is that the disposition is capable of two constructions,
one of which makes the instrument entirely valid and
the other of which makes the instrument entirely in-
1 3 In Re Wenmoth's Estate, supra, note 9; Prichard v. Prichard, 83 W.Va.
652, 98 S.E. 877 (1919).
14 Crawford v. Carlisle, 206 Ala. 379, 89 So. 565 (1921); Bank of New York
v. Kaufman, 26 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1941); affimed mem. 261 App.
Div. 819, 25 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1st Dept. 1941); Matter of Pulitzer, 148 Misc.
116, 265 N.Y. Supp. 401 (1933).
'5 A. L. I. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Sec. 242 (1940); W. Barton
Leach, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d Ed., 1940,
p. 394; Elliott v. Elliott, 12 Sim. 276, 59 Eng. Rep. 1137 (Ch. 1841).
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valid. It is natural to presume that the transferor would
intend the construction which will make the instru-
ment valid. In the case in which the court seemed to
be influenced by a desire to avoid violation of the rule
against perpetuities, it is interesting to notice that in
two of them the possibility of increase in the class was
quite remote because of the age of the parents desig-
nated, and in the other the court stressed the fact that
the will was drafted by a prominent attorney who cer-
tainly would not make gifts which would violate the
rule against perpetuities'0 ."
This same view was also very strongly stated by Ernst
Freund:
"Wherever reasonable construction can save a gift
which, under purely technical rules of construction,
violates the rule against perpetuities, the gift ought to
be saved. If the law is now otherwise, it ought to be
changed; if the English law is otherwise and is nine-
teenth-century law, it should not be followed'."
However, Casner also suggested that it appears that a
majority of courts follow the opposite view, which he refers
to as the more orthodox view 8. A concise statement of this
view has been given by Gray:
"The Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of con-
struction, but a peremptory command of law. It is
not, like a rule of construction, a test, more or less
artificial, to determine intention. Its object is to defeat
intention. Therefore every provision in a will or settle-
ment is to be construed as if the Rule did not exist,
16 A. J. Casner, Class Gifts, op. cit. supra, note 7, Sec. 22.46 at p. 390.
17 Freund, Suggestions Concerning Future Interests, 33 Harv. L.Rev. 526 at
535 (1920).
18 A. J. Casner, Class Gifts, op. cit. supra, note 7, Sec. 22.46 at p. 390.
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and then to the provision so construed the Rule is to
be remorselessly applied"9."
The rule of convenience applies both to realty and per-
sonalty. It is not limited to gifts to children, but applies equally
to gifts to a class of other relatives such as nephews, nieces,
grandchildren, brothers, sisters, etc., or even to a class of
persons not related to the transferor, such as "... to the
members of the X Fire Company"."
In conclusion, it can be said that the rule of convenience
is a rather clearly defined rule of construction which is in
common application in our courts today. It would seem that
little criticism can be directed at the inclusionary aspects of
the rule. And, while there may be some criticism of its
exclusionary aspects, to this writer, the alternatives to the
rule are more objectionable. The draftsman of any instru-
ment can, of course, solve all of these problems by careful and
precise drafting and, in this way the draftsman can reduce the
necessity for court interpretations.
In spite of the fact that many of these instruments are
drafted by laymen and many of the instruments that are drafted
by lawyers are very adequate and complete and therefore do
not involve litigation, many of the instruments which are
drafted by lawyers are woefully inadequate and do involve
litigation. In fact, the poor draftsmanship in this area has
caused A. James Casner to remark that "this branch of the
law, however, is a shameful memorial to the ineptness of
the profession in drafting instruments21."
THEODORE H. FOCHT
19 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd Ed., 1915, Sec. 626. For
some cases following this view, see: Dime Savings & Trust Co. v. Watson,
254 Ill. 419, 98 N.E. 777 (1912); Crawford v. Carlisle, supra, note 14;
Lockhart's Estate, 306 Pa. 394, 159 At 1. 874 (1932); In Re Newlin's Es-
tate, 367 p. 527, 80 At 1.2d 819 (1932).
20 Millikin National Bank of Decatur v. Wilson, 343 IM. 55, 174 NXE. 857,
75 A.L.R. 117 (1931); Johnson v. Cook Benevolent Institute, 33 Ky. Law
Rep., 722 IIl. S.W. 294 (1908).
21 A. J. Casner, Class Gifts to Other Than to "Heirs" or "Next of Kin" Increase
in the Class Membership, 51 Harv. L.Rev. 254 at 308.
